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i. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
A significant number of Space Transportation System (STS)
missions will require that payloads be placed in high energy
orbits which cannot be achieved using the Space Shuttle alone.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing an Inertial Upper
Stage (IUS) System to fulfill both NASA and DOD requirements for
such missions._ The IUS will extend the STS operating regime to
include higher orbits, orbital plane change_, geosynchronous
orbits, and interplanetary trajectories.
DOD has contracted with The Boeing Company tm complete full-
scale development of an expendable solid propellant IUS System
that will satisfy both the NASA and DOD requirements. Marshallo
Space Flight Center (MSFC) is designated the NASA Center
responsible for _US Prmject Management and coordination activities.
during IUS development. This.responsibility includes the definition
of NASA-unique mission requirements and analysis to ensure that
these requirements are properly implemented. Eigure i_i shows the
relationship among the major IUS milestones and the Boeing schedule
for developing the IUS software.
Under a previous contract (see Reference i) M&S Computing,
Inc., defined. NASA-unique flight software requirements, evaluated
the ZUS software preliminary design, analyzed the ZUS software
interfaces with other systems, and defined a cost-effective, level
for NASA participation in software verification. This report
d_sc:ibes a continuation of the above effort to analyze the IUS
software.
i.i Study Objectives
The objectives of this study were to provide the engineering
and data management sygtem_nalysis necessary to evaluat_ the
detailed design of the IUS software. This effort also was to
ensure that the IUS fulfills NASA mission requirements and
integrates successfully with the Space Transportation System
(STS).
1.2 scope
Four primary tasks were performed during this contract:
i. Design Analysis.
2. Validation Requirements Analysis--
3. Interface Analysis.
4, Requirements Analysis.
Figure 1-2 shows these four tasks and how they interact with the
Boeing software development effort for the _US flight software.
The scope of each tasn is described in mors detail in the follcwin_
paragraphs.
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1.2.1 Software Detailed Design Analysis
The detailed design of the IUS flight software presented in the
Type C5 Computer Program Product Specification (CPPS) was analyzed
and evaluated for compliance with the NAgA requirements identified
in the Type B5 Computer Program Development Specification (CPDS).
Analyses included active support for-technical interchange (TI)
meetings, software working group meetings, the Two-Stage Critical
Design Review (CDR), and other meetings with SAMSO, Boeing, TRW,
and Martin Marietta. Performance-of the task also included
evaluating other applicable software documentation. Periodic
deliveries of software schedules showing the Boeing activities,
the TRW activities, and the M&S Computing activities were accomplished
• 1.2.2 Software Test Requirements
Software test plans from _oeing and TRW were evaluated in
preparation for the T_o-Stage. System CDR and Software CDR, respectively
Further definition of the NASA-unique test requirements was post-
poned until Boeing provides greater detail in the Ty_e. B5 NASA
Addendum and until the NASA PDR which has been tentatively re-
scheduled for August 1979.
i_2_3 Interface_Analysis and Definition
Current design and proposed change& to the spacecraft and
third stage i_terfaces were analyzed for impact on NASA missions
and payloads. Specific requirements for the_NASA communications
net were also evaluated.
1.2.4 Software Requirements
Each release of the DOD/STS CPDS and the NASA Addendum were
evaluated to determine whether NASA-unique requirements were -
included, modified, or affected. New.requirements and an explicit
restatement of established NASA requir_e_Kents were delivered as each
new release was evaluated.
1.3 Software Analysis Overview
An overview of the IUS software analysis activities is shown .......
in Figure 1-3 with emphasis in two software areas: Support Soft-
ware and Operational Flight Software (OFS).
The major areas of emphasis were the OFS requirements (CPDS)
and design (CPPS) analysis. Figure 1-4 depicts the events
associated with each of the four major M&S Computing tasks. The
scheduled events primarily represent analysis activities documented
in the IUS memoranda listed in Appendix A.
-4-
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Requirements evaluation activites are summarized in Section 2
with an updated status for the NASA-unique requirements. Section 3
identifies the analyses associated with technical interchanges on
the preliminary DOD/STS software design and the results of a
review of the CPPS for the DOD/STS Software CDR. Analyses
associated with the software test documentation, is presented in
Section 4. A discussion of communications and spacecraft inteL-
face evaluation work is found in Section 5. From these basics, a
set of conclusions concerning the NASA IUS Software development
is presented in Section 6 along with accompanying recommendations
for further analyses and evaluation. Appendices B and C provide---
additional background information on guidance, navlg tlon,_ and
control, and on planning documentation and support software analysis,
respectively.
-'7-
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2. SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION
The IUS DOD/STS flight software requirements have undergone
a major transition during this contract period. In Table 2-1
the first _olumn-indicates the four CPDS versions evaluated
durinq the year, and the third column presents the corresponding :
I M&S Computing's evaluation reference. Revision F was rewrittenby the S_ftware Working Group and then basel ned as Revision G.
The NASA Addendum to the CPDS, however, has remained stag-
nant since the initial release on July 28, 1978. A draft rewrite
- designated Revision-H was released in April 1979. This version.
F i improved some areas and degraded other areas. For example, a NASA
a major section on spinup requirements was replaced with a To Be
Supplied (TBS) and the Communication section Iestricts a mission to
use either the Tracking and-Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) or
the Spaceflight Tracking and Data .Network (STD _l, but not both, during
the same_ission. The NASA-unique requirements are still in the
preliminary stages of definition.
NASA-unique requirements stem from three sources:
_ • Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) requirements
for planetary mlsslons.
• NASA-unique communication requirements.
• _NASA-unique IUS three-stage configuration.
A summary af-the NASA requirements previously identified is
presented in Table 2-2. These requirements were evaluated against
Revision G of. the CPDS and the Revision E NASA Addendum to deter-
_ mine the implementation status. Table 2-3 presents a cr_ss-
" reference matrix between the NASA-unique requirements identified
by M&S Computing (Reference 8) and the pertinent (or related)
sections of the basic CPDS, Revision G, and the NASA Addendum.
A description of the CPDS section content is also included for an
easy reference. NASA-unique requirements are discussed in the
following overview, paragraph 2.1. Boeing's evaluations of these
NASA functional requirements are presented in paragraph 2.2 along
_ with an M&S Computing assessment of current requirement status.
2.1 Overview
Derived requirements for the Executive and Mission Sequencing
functions have a relatively minor impact on IUS flight software.
! No NASA-unique flight software requirements have been identified
! for the navigation function. Although the utilization of the
navigation software function is unique for NASA planetary missions,
I -9-
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IUS SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS EVALUATIONS
NASA
DOD/STS ADDENDUM
CPDS VERSION VERSION REFERENCE
January 13, 1978 .......... 8
September 15, 1978 July 28, 1978 9, i0 -
(Procurement SRecifica- Revision E
tion, Revision F)
October 15, 1978 July 28, 1978 ii, 12
(CPDS, Revision F)
Decembe_ i, 1978 July 28, 1978 Table 2-2
(CPDS, Revision G) (This report)
March 23, 1979 _ Section 2
(Revision H, Draft) (This report)
Table 2-i
i
-10- I
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ZNASA-UNIQUE FLIGHT SOFTWARE
REQI///_MENT S SUMMARY
i
Software Function Requirements
• Executive Provide I/O control and formatting of
commands to the SCU for melection of
the NASA transponder mode (TDRSS
or STDN) and NASA antenna switching.
• Mission Sequencing Provide sequence control and timing
functions for planetary missions to
support second and third stage ignition
timing, third stage spinup, and
separation of the second stage.
Navigation None. DOD has incorporated essential
NASA functions for position _nd attitute
state initialization and updates.
• Guidance_- Calculate on-pad and on-orbit launch
window targeting parameters for
planetary missions, including
multiple-on-orbit launch opportunities,
to meet planetary injection accuracy
requ_i_rements.
• Attitude Control Provide the capability to spinup the
second stage/third stage/spacecraft
configuration.to TBD rpm under active
attitude control while maintaining the
inertial orientation of-the spin axis
- within specified limits.
• Communications Provide autonomous control _f IUS/
NASA antenna switching for _F ccmmunica-
- tion_ with the Orbiter, a selected
TDRS, or a selected STDN ground station.
: • Redundancy Management Maintain an antenna status flag as
-- set by ground command _or each of
20 IUS/NASA antennas.
• Checkout No NASA-unique requirements identified.
'2
._ Table 2-2
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DOD has incorporated the essential capabilities for initialization
and update of the position and attitude state. Areas of concern
pertaining to the_guidance software_func_ionar_inc!udedin ..........................................
:. Section 2.3.
NASA-unique attitude control requirements, are associated with
stabilization and spinup of the third stage. Some details of the
: attitude control requirements are to be determined from planetary
injection accuracy analyses, including spin-stage dynamic per-
I formance. Definition of the following attitude control require-
ments are dependent on completion of these analyses:
• Attitude and attitude rate limits for the inertial
attitude at start of spinup.
• Spinup under closed loop control.
- Attitude and attitude rate limits for pitch and
yaw.
- Spin-rate at which spinup under closed-loop control
will be terminated.
• Definition of a verified attitude control law for
spinup.
• Tolerance on final spin rate.
i !i The _et Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) requirements for the I_US
planetary mission accuracies from the IUS System Specificatien
of March_17,_1978, are presented in paragrah B.3. o/ Appendix__B.
The appendix also includes adetailed description of JPL'_
approach to meeting injection accuracies by calculation ofa
Pigure Of Merit (based on a statistical.measure of the spacecraft
velocity requirements at mi_o control removal of IUS
i_jection errors.
NASA-unique communications requirements have been defined
for autonomous antenna switching. The antenna switching algo-
rithm is based on the geometry of the IUS position, IUS attitude
(and antenna configuration), Orbiter .osztlon, and positions of
the TDRSS satellites and STDN ground stations. For NASA three-
stage IUS missions, communications requirements after start of
spinup are still an area of concern as discussed below.
Currently, the IUS System Specification (SS) and baseline
design make no provisions for downlink of the second stage
telemetry stream after initiation of "spinning stage operation."
-Z3-
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AS a result of removing the third stage avionics, no attitude
state data from the vehicle will be available to support post-flight
evaluation of third stage dynami_ performance (including spinup,
second stage separation, third stage burn, and spacecraft
separation). Also, the above provisions of the IUS/SS and the
baseline design prohibit compliance with part (i) of the.following
paragraph of the IES/SS for three-stage missions:.
3.1.5.2.7 Telemetry
The IUS shall be capable of transmitting to the
ground: (I) state vector and attitude data
immediately prior to spacecraft/IUS separation,
(2) verification of IUS vehicle to spacecraft
separation events, and (3)verification of
received commands.
For three-stage missions under current IUS/SS requireq_ents, the
last opportunity to downlink _he IUS state vector and vehicle
attitude will be just prior to start of third stage spinup.
It is recommended that the second stage radio frequency
(RF) system remain active during third stage spinup as long as
the IUS attitude reference is available to support autonomous
antenna switching. With an adequate software 2apability for
antenna switching, second stage RF communications can be maintained
at least through the active attitude control phase.of.third stage
spinup. This additional telemetry will provide data for a period
critical to successful third stage performance.
The major NASA impac_ on redundancy management software is
the maintenance of status flags for the NASA antennas.. No specific
NASA-unique requirements have been identified which affect the
onboard checkout software function. However, a potential source
of NASA-unique checkout software requirements is that software
required to aupport anz NASA-unique tests of common DOD/STS IUS
subsystems. A decision to utilize DOD. test procedurea for common
DOD/NASA IUS subsystems could eliminate this potential source.
The following items are recommended for further study:
• Formal coordination of NASA-unique software require-
ments within the NASA/IUS community prior to incor-
poration in the Type B5 specification (CPDS_.
• Thorough planetary injection accuracy analysis (including
spin stage dynamic performance) to suppor_detailed
definition of guidance and attitude control require-
ments for three-stage missions.
-24-
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• Coordination and definition of a firm timeline for
communications requirements during NASA missions
including third stage spinup and the resulting Lmpact
on the antenna switching algorithm.
• Continued analysis of IUS flight software development
activities and products to ensure th&t NASA-unique ...................
requirements are met.
- 2.2 NASA-unique Functional Requirements
_ The NASA requirements for the eiqht baseline software
functions defined in Table 2-2 are driven by requirements from
i : IUS-STS-100, Volume 3, and Volume 3-1 (see Reference 14). NASA-
_ unique IUS_flight software requirements, are either directly driven
by the IUS/SS, Volume 3-I, or derived from its provisions.
[
The state of the NASA-unique requirements to be incorporated
in Revision H of the NASA addendum (Reference 13) is detailed in
i the following subparagraphs and related tables. There is a sub-
paragraph for each of the eight baseline software functions. The
i _ related tables contain the NASA_unique requirements as originally
described in Refer:nce l, the source paragraphs from IUS-STS-100
i (Reference 14), and the present status defined by Boeing in
i Reference 15.
!
2.2.1 Executive
The _executiv_ softwar_ function must provide proper manage-
-" ment of the NASA-unique software requirements contained in other
software functions. At the present time, the executive function
capability required by and planned for D_D missions supports NASA
requirements with one exception. This exception is-related to th_
communications subsysten_ which must provide compatibility w._h
STDN ground stations and the TDRSS.
NASA-unique softwaTe requirements for the executive function
[ are presented in Table 2-4. The required commands to the Signal
Conditioner 'Unit (SCU) will be determined by the executive from
_ outputs of the command processing and autonomous antenna.switching
subfunctions of the communication software. In Reference 15 Boeing
states that the_present transponder system does not distinguish
between STDN or TDRSS stations and that a change will be included
in the NASA Addendum revision of September l, 19T9. To support the
: August 1979 Preliminary Design Review (PDR), an Advance Documentation
Revision Notice (ADRN) is needed to document this requirement. The
_ other present-status items are acceptable.
_.: -25-
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II 2.2.2 Mission Sequencing
utilization of the mission sequencing software for NASA
planetary missions will be impacted by the longer duration of
the three-stage missions, and by launch window and multiple on-
orbit injection opportunity requirements. This impact will result
in increased size of the event tablc (additional attitude and rate
maneuvers, additional navigation updates, etc.) and may result in
increased use of the real-time command capability for sequence
changes. The resulting software requirements are presentedin
Table 2-5. These requirements are derived from guidance, attitude
control and communications software function d e
interface requirements.
Boeing states that the mission sequence table is constructed
to provide the separation of the second stage after spinup; however,
the thlrd-stage spinup sequencing requirements still reference
third-stage a_ionics operations. This section will require an
update when the changes identified in ECP 247 are implemented to remove
the third-stage avionics.
2.2.3 Guidance
The requirements to support interplanetary missions are, of
course, NASA-unique. For these missions, it is necessary to target
to a specific hyperbolic-escape velocity, V _ , rather than to an
orbital period as in the geosynchronous missions. Computation ol
the hyperboli_ escape velocity is dependent on the relative motion
of the target planet. The guidance scheme must also permit targeting
on successive orbital opportunities without memory update.
The NASA-unique software requirements for guidance and target-
ing are presented in Table 2-6. Since the interplanetary injection
accuracies are not explicitly def%ned, the permissible variations
in the constraining vector could not be bounded in the software
computations.
Boeing states that the planned guidance update in Revision
H of the DOD/STS CPDS provides for on-pad and on-orbit launch
window targeting parameters; however, this does not answer the
question of delay time accommodation: specifically, how well the
STS-100 (Volume i) requirement for retargeting to a dissimilar
mission within two hours of launch can be handled. At the DOD/STS
Two-Stage System CDR (Reference 16), Boeing deferred applying the
Revision H retargeting requirements to planetary missions until
further analysis is completed. This leaves t_e targeting parameters
for multiple on-orbit launch opportunities undefined. Finally,
Boeing states that planetary accuracy requirements identified in
ECP 247 shall be determined during NASA certification.-
A detailed discussion on guidance is presented in Appendix B.
-ZT-
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2.2.4 Attitude Control
Utilization of the attitude control software is affected by
NASA missions in three ways. First, the use of directional
antennas for NASA RF communications may call for additional
attitude changes to maintain communications. Second, the three-
stage missions call for additional attitude and roll maneuvers._ _
The third area is also related to the three-stage missions and
involves spinning the entire second stage/third stage/spacecraft
configuration using the IUS Reaction Control Subsystem (RCS).
Existing DOD software will support the first case if autonomous
maneuver capability were enabled. The second area is fully
supported by _OD software and the third has unique requirements
as defLned in Table 2-7.
Table 2-7 reflects the Boeing statement that the attitude
control software shall provide the capability to spinup the --
third stage/spaoecraf_ configuration with gyro saturation occurring
at 5 rpm; there is no mention of the 70 rpm requirement. A require-
ment to terminate spinup at-a desired rpm would be preferable to.
simply commanding the roll thrusters full-on until RCS is depleted.
For the latter case, the sp__n rate would not be predictable.
The requirements also stats that spinup shall be in the fixed
inertial attitude of the I_S software. The NASA Addendum, Revision
H replaces this mode with a TBS leaving this requirement undefined.
The reqUirement_ state that active control shall be terminated
prior to loss of the attitude referencer-however,.RCS pitch and
yaw thrusters are not positively inhibited prior tcu loss of the
Inertial Measuremen_ Unit (IMU) at approximately 5 rpm (refer to
Line No. 5°1.4.1 of Table 2-7).
2.2.5 Communications: Antenna Control Function
TO provide the required TDRSS compatibility, the NASA RF
communications baseline uses ten directional antennas for spherical
coverage rather than the two omnis used by DOD. Although DOD has
implemented an autonomous antenna switching capability, NASA
requirements for autonomous antenna switching are unique in two
respects:
• The large number of antennas (with narrower beamwidth)
de_ands more frequent antenna switching to maintain
spherical coverage as the IUS translates and rotates.
• Autonomous selection of a communication link mu_
consider the two-TDRSS satellites and five STDN
ground stations instead of the Air Force Space Ground
Link-System (SGLS) ground stations.
Table 2-8 presents the NASA-unique software requirements for
autonomous antenna control.
-30-
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The NASA-unique requirements specify an automatic mode
selection algorithm that will autonomously select the best
communications link from the available choices: five Space-
- flight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) stations, two Tracking :
- and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) stations, or the Orbiter. The
current status of the Boeing design provides only a manual mode
selection capability through an uplink command,, i.e., withoutestablished communications, the mode cannot be switched.
A more severe problem, however, is the lack of any design.
provision to include the TDRSS communications link. The Boeing
status proposes loading the TDRSS coordinates /n the table
reserved for ground stations on a DOD mission. This solution
does not allow loading the STDN coordinates into the flight
software.for the specified mission. In other words, TDRSS and
STDN are mutually exclusive and cannot be used on the same
mission. This solution is not acceptable to MSFC and does not
meet the requirements of STs-100, Volume 3-i, Sections 3.1.5.2.7
and 3.1.5,3,6.
The requirement to select the communication link in a manner
which maximizes commancLuplink signal strength at the antenna
will not be implemented. This algorithm would result is pre-
dominate selection of STDN ground stations (whene-er available)
instead of the TDRSS which is the preferred link.
NASA-unique requ/rementE to compensate for spacecraft
• occultation are also not provided by Boeing's software design.
I In a telecon Boeing personnel stated that the current design
provides an acceptable ninety percent telemetry coverage and
that provisions for occultation have_never been established as
: firm requirements.
Requirements associate_ with maintaining communications
during spinup are not met with the status defined by Boeing.
Antenna switching is supported up t_ a rotational rate of five
degrees per second, which is less than 1 rpm, so there is no
capability to continue communications throughout spinup. There
is an inconsistency in the Boeing status regarding drGpout of
telemetry (TLM) during antenna switching. Line No. 6-1.3
indicates_a 5-second loss of TLM but Line 6-1.5 states that
switching is make-before-break. A clarification of status is
- needed - our understanding is that there is a short loss of TLM
- signal during antenna switching.
Current implementation of the manual (uplink) override of
antenna selection provides a short-term override of 30 seconds
with an automatic return to autonomous selection processing.
This design accomplishes the intent of an override command, if
a longer override period is desired, successive o_ze._.l.e commands
may be issued.
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A detailed discussion of communication interface limitations
that may result in a loss of telemetry is presented in paragraph
5.1.
2.2.6 Redundancy Management
The Boeing design status in Table 2-9 fails to provide redun- --
dancy management for the antennas or-the STDN/TDRSS stations. If
a bad antenna or station is selected, the IUS telemetry is lost
until another switch occurs to a good communications link. Uplink
commands could easily remove failed links and antennas from
consideration. An antenna failure would have to be uplinked __
after the IUS has switched back to a good antenna.
2.2_7 Checkout
As shown in Table 2-10, Boeing states that the IUS checkout
functions are accomplished _ithin the scope of the contract. No
unique checkout requirements are identified for NASA prelaunch
and predeployment operations. In previous NASA programs, ground
checkout software has been much more comprehensive than the
functions provided by the I/JS software. Additional checkout
functions may be identified as the Boeing design of NASA-unique
software matures.
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3. SOFTWARE DESIGN ANALYSIS
During the course of this study, M&S Computing performed a
thorough engineering and data Eystem analysis of the evolving
design of the- IUS software-and its potential, with respect to
fulfillment of the NASA requirements_ Three major documents
were_evaluated in the study effort.
These are: .....
• IUS Computer Program Development Plan. __
• Computer Program Development Specification (Type B-5).
• Computer Program Product Sp_ecification (Type C-5).
/ In addition, M&S Computing supported appropriate technical inter-
change meetings, software working groups, and preliminary/critical
design reviews.
This section describes the results of the design _nalysis, dis-
cusses the status of NASA-unique requirements with respect to the
software design, and highlights our concerns with the current de-
sign and its likely effect on NASA mission support. This section
also provides a review of the latest NASA-Unique Software Schedule
and points out inconsistencies developing out o_ continmed schedule
compression. The details of support provided to technical int_r-
change, software_working group, and design review meetings ate con-
tained in Appendi_ C.
3.1 Detailed Design Analysis
The design analysis activity focused on four consecutive re-
leases of the IUS Operational Software Computer Program Product
Specification, TRW Doclunent Number 33332-01__ dated:
• Scptombcr 28, 19T8.
• November 16, 1978.
• December 29, 1978.
• March 30, 1979.
These documents were reviewed from three different aspects:
(i) compliance with proper software design standards and procedures;
, (2) faithful implementation of requirements as defined in the appro-
priate, corresponding level o_the IUS Computer Program Development
Specification (Type B-5)t and (3) compatibility with NASA-unique
software requirements.
In addition, as a separate, but closely related effort, the
Computer Program Development Specification for "MOS (Mission Opera-
tions Segment) Postprocsssing S_ftware, Parts I and II," Boeing
$290-50010, October 16, 1978, was evaluated _o determine the validity
and acceptability of the mission data load support software.
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3.1.i Overview
The first (and most lasting) impression gained from this
analysis effort is the overwhelming volume of documentation in-
volved. The documentation results from a laudible and.-conscien-
tious attempt to adhere to modern program practices; _oweve_, it
also creates new problems. First of all, there are too many re-
leases of complete requirement/design sets. The traceability from
design statement to requirement statement (of'equivalent release
levels) is excellent. Maintaining a library of current equivalent
levels 6f Type B5 and_Type C5 specifications is difficult. Identi-
fication of changes/differences between release levels is virtually
impossible. This problem has been compounded by the lack.of an
active, current Software Problem Report (SPR) file and timely distri-
_. bution of Advanced _ocumentation Revision Notices (ADRN's) and Spe-
cification Change Notices (SCN's).
In general, the design adheres to good structured design prin-
ciples. If anything, it might carry the refinement process_too far.
Some functions are fractured into quite small modules. The handling
of interrupts and lack of software test considerations (e.g., power
up, inhibits, etc..) presents some concern; however, these are more of
a-requirements deficiency than a design flaw.
The major concerns of the DOD/STS IUS software design, as
presented in design reviews, center on the timing and sizing over-
runs. Again, the solution lies as much in tightening of require-
ments as in design modification. Both the prime conaractor, Boeing,
and the software developer, TRW, are working toward solutions to
these problems and have made significant progress. The open question
is whether the gains made in the current design will b_ of sufficient
magnitude to adsorb the addition of known or _nan_,_._a_ed NASA
requirements.
- 3.1.2 DOD/STS Design
. The specific observations made during the design analysis of
each release level of the-Type C5 specification were documented as
memoranda, placed in the IUS file, and distributed via technical
reports to the NASA Contracting Officer's Representative (COR).
These detailed memoranda are reference_ in Appendix A of this report
i Tables 3-1 through 3-4 present a summarized/tabularized form of the
observations made, deficiencies noted, and corrective actions taken.
Each_ table reflects the concerns evident at a specific Type C-5 spe-
cification release level (Note: The paragraph numbers in the B5,
C5 columns relate to Revision G and to the March 30, 1979, release
respectively); consequently, some concerns are carried foF_ard to
subsequent levels awaiting resolution. The tables are structured
by Computer Program Component (CPC) and each concer_ is referenced
" to the applicable Type C5 and/or Type B5 specification paragraph
number (again, note that paragraph numbers reflect the March 30,
1979, release) except in those cases where the concern is of a general
generic nature. Not all concerns have been resolved as yet. Satis-
factory resolution of all concerns will be ensured only by careful
monitoring of future releases of the requirement and design speci-
fications.
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D3.1.3 NASA-Unique Requirements
_ Throughout the evolution of the IUS operating software re-
quirements/design process, there has been an ambivalent approach
to the incorporation of NASA requirements. AS a result, the cur-
rent version of the Type C5 specification (March 1979) does not
contain a thorough design for the NASA-unique requirements, as
specified in the October 15, 1978, version of the NASA Addendum,
$290-51002. This is an ongoing problem, caused by the failure to
successfully convey NASA requirements through the DOD/prime con-
tractor as Type B5 specifications to the software development con-
tractor.. I_ other words, NASA has developed the NASA software re-
quirements, but the software developer has not received them in a
u_able form (i.e., a concise set of requirements statements).
In _eneral, the major deficiencies in terms of implementation
of NASA=unique requirements are:
• Antenna selection, switching, and line-of-sight computa-
_ tion for TDRSS, Orbiter, and ground stations.
: : • Processing of NASA second stage separation and third
stage sequence.
. • Attitude control and third stage spinup processing.
• Figure-of-merit (FOM) calculation and achievement of
_ " FOM design requirements.
• Variable data update (command uplink) after deployment,
such as state vector update, initial conditions, etc.
+- Guidance software routines are the most thorough in implementing
NASA requirements. Amore detailed description of-the communica-
tions interface and Guidance, Navigation& Control Requirements
analysis can be found in paragraph 5.1 and Appendix B, respectively.
3.2 Dgsi_n Concerns
There are three major concerns requiring close NASA scrutiny,=
during the remaining development cycle of the DOD/STS IUS system
software. First, unless full consideration is given to the NASA
requirements during baseline implementation, the impact of additional
resources to support NASA requirements may exceed timing and sizing
constraints of the baseline system, resulting in extensive system
software modification. Second, the current software design may not
-- be flexible enough to conform to effective NASA Mission Operations
control of the IUS during deployment and flight (i.e., command up-
date of variable mission parameters such as Orbiter state vector,
initial conditions, etc.). Third, the lack of compatible software
support tools for NASA in-house verification, validation, and test -
.... particularly in the case of mission load data - may significantly
increase software testing costs to NASA on a per-mission basis.
7+.
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- 3.3 NASA-Unique Software Schedule
i
Figure 3-1 depicts the most recent schedule for NASA-unique
: IUS software. Several points are worthy of mention. Most obvious %
is the fact that the schedule is rapidly becoming compressed. For
example, Preliminary Design Review (PDR) is shown with. an approxi-
mate six-month slip. Any additional slippage will certainly begin
to affect the Critical Design Review (CDR) and, consequently, the
final Planetary Navigation and_Control Equation Certification. AI-
J though NASA planetary software delivery is scheduled for. October
1981, it should be noted that this software is required by the fourth
quarter of 1980___ less than a year from CDR.
The next apparent anomaly is the fact that the requirements
development is now running in parallel with design. This is an
i_! unusual situation which ordinarily becomes expensive because of
the continual false starts and rework. In fact, coding is in pro-
cess before the requirements are firm.
i
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4. SOFTWARE TESTING PRECEDING PAGE BLANK. NOT, E|I,hp_D
Test considerations for the NASA MSFC encompass both the
NASA-unique software and the DOD/STS OFS test programs. MSFC
must remain involved in the DOD software testing because the
common portion of the software represents more than 90 percent
of the software used for NASA missions. NASA-unique require-
ments will comprise less _han i0 percent of the flight software.
Figure 4-1 presents the major NASA activities during software de-
! velopment: NASA-unique requirements definition, design evaluation,
_ design verification (of NASA-unique requirements), and IV&V for-
i NASA missions_ Testing for NASA-unique software is based upon the
assumption that the DOD software is thoroughly tested; therefore,
test plans, procedures, and results of the DOD software testing
must be evaluated ta verify that the NASA mission requirements
_ are satisfied. Any problems noted during the design or test evalua-
tions will be forwarded to SAMSO for corrective action.
4.1 DOD/STS OFS Testin@ .............
4.1.1 Test Scheduling
Rescheduling the first operational flight of DOD/STS re-
arranged the priorities in the IUS software development and test
schedules. When the first launch slipped almost six months, the
Titan launch in September 1980 became the first IUS mission. This
_ i has forced Boeing to accelerate development of the T/tan software
: and this reorientation is reflected in_-the test documentation.
' " 4.1.2 Tes_ Documentation
Detailed test documentation released for the DOD Software CDR
is devoted exclusively to DOD/STS and Titan software. Boeing's
detaile_ test requirements document (Reference 2) has the framework
to include all three software configurations but the CDR version
i c_oes not contain any NASA-unique software test requirements.
'" The TRW Verification.Test Plan (Reference 3) co,rains two en-
i _ tries for NASA antenna command verification but does not include any
i • o_her references to NASA-unique software testing. This document
_ does not address the various software configurations, so no plan is
identified for testing the NASA software which will be identified
• and incorporated into the test program at a later date.
:7
_
_ , The 5oeing Computer Program Test Plan (Reference 4) is a more
generic document that includes provisions for NASA _est!ng. This
- document thoroughly presents the test philosophy for _US software
! verification, preliminary qualification testing (PQT), and final
qualification testing (FQT) with schedules for the three software
- configurations. The only shortcoming from a NASA standpoint was
an out-of-date software development schedule.
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4.1.3 Test Facilities-
The Titan Verification and Validation (V&V) Simulator in the
System Integration Laboratory (SIL) is nearing completion (July
1979 for Titan) and is beginning to support preliminary OFS inte-
gration tests. Phasing the OFS integration allows testing to begin
before the V&V simulator is fully checked out. This V&V simulator
will implement the breakpoint/restart capability proposed in Re-
ference_5 and at t_e V&V software CDR by MSFC personnel. --
4.2 NASA-Unique Software Testin_
4.2.-i Test-Scheduling
Any impact of the slip in DOD/STS IUS software, delivery on the
NASA-ttnique software development schedule has not yet been. re-
flected in Boeing schedules. Figure l-1 shows that the completion_
of.DOD/STS two-stage validation is within three months of the he-
ginning of NASA Twin Stage validation. During this period, NASA-
unique software coding and testing competes with the DOD package
for facility and manpower resources. NASA personnel must remain
closely involved in the TRW verification, BAC validation_ and IV&V
testing to ensure that the final software design satisfies the
NASA mission requirements.
4.2.2 Test Documentation
Boeing and TRW test documentation _hould be updated prior to
the NASA CDR. Therefore, the FQT Requirements delivery two months
after the CDR (see E/qure 3-i) should be rescheduled for a release
in__arly January of 1980 to support the NASA CDR.
Th_ NASA-unique software test requirements document scheduled
for release by M&S Computing during this contract period was post-
poned. Test requirements must _ be based upon a good set of design
requirements, and, as Section 2 pointed out, the NASA Addendum is
not mature enough to write even a preliminary set of test require-
ments. A neasonable target date for a preliminary test requirements
definition is in October of %979 foll_wing the NASA PDR (slipped
from. March to August 1979) and the subsequent CPDS NASA-Addendum
update on September l, 1979 (see Figure 3-i).
This delay will allow the Boeing system engineering analysis
to be reflected in the NASA Addendum and still allow the release
of meaningful tes_ requirements prior to the NASA CDR in
February 1980.
4.2.3 Test Facilities
In past programs, NASA MSFC developed in-house software test
facilities to verify that the software product satisfied the over-
all system or mission requirements. The conclusion of the !US
Software Requirements Definition Study (Reference 6) is that such
a real-time test :acility would be too costly. However, this does
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not preclude an independent NASA verification and validation pro-
- gram. Figure 4-2 presents the independen_ verification and vali-
dation (IV&V) activities MSFC may still undertake. The. require-
ments, design, and node analysis activities can be accomplished
_-- without a real-time simulation facility. Two facilities are availa-
i- ble for evaluation.of real-time software performance:_ the Boeing
DOD/STS V&V simulator or the Martin Marietta IV&V facility. The
Boeing facility would not provide an independent test facility, but
careful coordination of the test requirements and procedures could
avoid performing d__uplicate_tests and still fully validate the NASA-
unique software. The in-house IV&V effort would require the follow-
ing tasks from test facility personnel:
: • Review the test requirements document to ensure that the.
_._ tests are within IV&V faci!ity cap__ties.
• Prepare a test plan to define test milestones, the pro-
• cedures required (general outline, not specific content),
_ the schedules for IV&V test facility usage for NASA tests,
and a test_requirement/test procedure cross-reference
matrix. This plan should reflect the procedures used for
DOD/STS software testing and the corresponding test re-
sults. .........
• Write detailed test procedures for each test requirement
and submit to NASA for review-and approval.
_ • Arrange-for "software test facilities suitable for perform .....
_- ing the software validation tests.
l • Perform IV&V tests on the IUS software released to support
the NASA missions.
• Record and submit Software Problem Reports (SPR's) to
MSFC for review-and submittal to SAMSO.
• Evaluate the test results against" the test requirements
to ensure proper software behavior.
IIi - A- Qulck-look" evaluation report should be delivered
) within i0 days after completing each test milestone.
- Final test report would be required 30 days after com-
pleting each test milestone.
i Data packages containing reduced test data, "as-run"
procedures, SPR's, and copies of test conductor logs
would be delivered to NASA.
Data recorded during final (demonstration) test runs
would be preserved until 30 days after the associated
- NASA IUS launch.
-60-
00000001-TSE11

• SPR's would be retested upon resolution and a closeout
disposition submitted to NASA.
NASA would analyze the test results to determine whether the
IUS software meets requirements for launch.
The primary mode of software testing should use a real-time
simulation to drive the flight software as it _xecutes on an IUS
flight computer (Delco M362S). A secondary testing mode using an
interpr@_ive computer simulation (ICS) may be used to supplement
the above real-time testing.
It is anticipated that some modification nf the Boeing V&V_
simulation used to test the basic DOD/STS flight software package.
will be required for NASA software testing. The extent of these
modifications is largely dependent on the requirements for attitude
• control during third stage spinup and on the design of the guidance
software.- MSFCexpressed these concerns at the V&V Simulator Soft-
ware CDR by submitting two Review Item Discrepancies (RID's_ see
Reference 7. Boeing stated that specific V&V Simulator modifica-
tions for NASA testing would be mddressed at a later date_ A sub-
sequent schedule release included the update (see Figure 3-1), but-
specific modifications, have not been identified.
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5. INTERFACE ANALYSIS
The IUS interfaces with the NASA com_unication_ network, the
third stage, and the spacecraft were analyzed. M&S Computing
activities associated with each of these interfaces are outlined
in the following paragraphs.
5.1 NASA Communications Requirem@nts Evaluation
In-f_ight Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) require-
ments_ for the IUS have been collected from References 14 and 17 and
depicted in Figure 5-1. It can be seen from 5-i that all NASA
missions require continuous tracking from the STDN system (Reference
18) or TDRSS (Reference 19). from IUS/Shuttle separation to space-
craft (S/C) separation for twin stage missions, or spinup for spin-
stabilized missions.
Telemetry of atate_vector and attitude data is required at all
solid rocket motor (SRM) burns. Commands to arm the SRM's are re-
quired for all burns and also to arm the S/C pyrotechnics.
The actual TT&C space-to-ground linkage is controlled by the
IUS software. This smftware selects one antenna of the onboard
antenna array that points to the closest ground station (see Re-
ference 2_) relative to the IUS. This selection process includes
the TDRSS satellites which are loaded as ground stations having
geosynchronous altiaude. The reliance on the onboard software to
select and maintain continuity of RF transmission for telemetry
and command data is subject to various physical limitations on the
STDN and TDRS systems that could, under many conditions, result
in short or long term losses o_ communication; herein referred to
as dropout&. The following paragraphs describe some of the limita ....
tions on the STDN and TDRS systems an__should lead to th_ conclusion
that the TDRS system cannot be handled as just another set of ground
stations. The major system limitations to be considered are listed
below and collected in Table 5-1 along with system impact predictions.
• IUS antenna switching dropout.
• TDRSS Zone of exclusion.
• TDRSS - Antenna steering angle limitations.
• TDRSS - Earth grazing angles.
• _DRSS RE earth impingement limitation.
• TDRSS Handled as ground station (signal strength).
• STDN - Ground effects (low elevation angles).
e STDN - Station masking (keyhole and terrain limitations).
• TDRSS and STDN Thermal noise due to sun-IUS orientation.
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The last paragraphs of this section describe a combination
of these system limitations as they act upon a typical Galileo
mission (Reference 4) to dropout communication prior to second
SRM ignition.
5.1.1 Antenna Switching Dropout
IUS telemetry and command dropout due to antenna switching
is discussed first for command reception and second for telemetry
-- transmission.
• Command reception when switching between antennas in the
STDN mode.
- May lose phase lock for 2 to 20 milliseconds during
switching period.
- Reestablishment could take 500 milliseconds.
- Each antenna switchover could result in 520 milli-
seconds of command or ranging loss.
- Commands may require repeating.
- Ranging may be disrupted.
- Operation in the TDRSS mode will be similarly affected.
-- The command reception design meets the iUS requirements____
for NASA compatibility of STDN or TDRSS signals.
• Telemetry Transmission
- Tel_metry data utilizes two STDN compatible subcarriers,
one-for pulse code modulation (PCM) and one for analog
vibration data (frequency modulat/c_ (FM)). Both are
compatible with S_T/)Nor Orbiter.
• - FM vibration data is not transmitted through TDRSS due
to format incompatibility and insufficient signal margin.
An RF command can _verride onboard computer software antenna
selection for 30 seconds. After 30 seconds, the onboard
algorithm again gains control of antenna selection. This
prevents an inadvertent lockout due to an incorrect
_ selection.
- While switching between antennas the receiving site may
lose phase lock and PCM decommutate lock due to the
switching transient. This period is estimated _o be less
than 2 3/4 seconds for STDN and TBD for TD_SS.
- The telemetry transmission design meets the operating
_equirements for STDN or TDRSS cempat._ll._.
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!5.1.2 Limitations of the TDRSS
Zone of Exclusion
The fixed positions, relative to the earth, of the two geo-
synchronous tracking satellites result in a "zone of exclusion._"
This zone is a region where TT&C cannot be conducted by TDRSS as
neither of the satellites can see into this zone. The zone is
• formed by the intersection of two cones of visibility (with re-
spect to each satellite) and the sphere of the earth. Details '
of the location of the zone are given in Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3.
Steerin_ An@ie Limitation
The maximum, single access antenna steering angle results in
three regions of no TT&C capability with respect to TDRSS at various
ranges of latitude and longitude above altitudes mf 12000 kilo-
meters. Details of these regions are contained in Figure 5-2.
, Earth Grazin@ An@les
TT&C signal attenuation due to earth grazing angle_ (angles
less than. six degrees). The angl_ formed by the tangent t_ the
earthZs surface through TDRSS and the line through the TDRSS and
the point being observed. Refer to Figure 5-4.
RI_ Earth Impingement Limitation (Flux Density Limits)
International limitations on the power level of" an RF signal
impinging on the earth may result in a potential coverage loss due
to reduced power levels of transmission (Reference 4).
TDRSS Simulated as a Ground Station
The signal strength of an STDN station will exceed that of a
TDRSS. Optimal signal strength will be a function of t.ansmzsslon
power_nd is not defined by the closest station concept as outlined
in the !US software requirements.
5.1.3 STDN
The STDN station locations are described in Figure 5-5.
Station Maskin_ (Keyhole and Terrain Limitations)
Ground stations are subject" to restrictions in elevation and
azimuth due to local terrain such as hills and buildings. Addi-
; tionally, hardware mountings (keyhole limitations) further restrict
• their overall movement. Examples of these azimuth and elevation
restrzctions (called station masking) are described in the follow-
ing paragraphs for the Goldstone and Madrid stations.
From Figure 5-6, there exists a loss of communications with
respect to the Goldstone Tracking _ _S_a. on for an azimuth near
__ 2_2 degrees from 0 degrees to 29 degrees in elevation. =.m.larl_,
00000001-TSF05
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- losses would occur for Madrid tracking station near azimuths of
86 degrees and 272 degrees from 0 degrees to 14.9 degrees in ele-
vation.
: The duration of losses in communication due to masking are •
dependent on the motion of the IUS relative to each tracking sta-
--- tion.
Ground Effects _
Low elevation angles of a targe_ (less than 5 degrees) with
• respect to a ground tracking station usually results in unreliable
TT&C due to. various distortions of signals as they react with
the ground and interfere with either incoming or outgoing wave
patterns.
Cumulative Effect
A typical cumulative effect of limitations acting on the TDRSS
i_ is shown in Figure 5-7 for the Planetary. Mission Profile. (NASA
Galileo)_ During this preliminary ieference mission second stage_
ignition occurs at the outer edge of-the zone-o£ exclusion. Thus,_
any time delay in orbit would.result in loss.of TT&C through the
TDRSS. In addition, this ignition-is at a small grazing angle with
respect.to TDRS and could also result in signal attenuation. This
location is also outside the ground station visibility for the
" STDN system. See References 18 and__l_9 for further discussion of
Pigures 5-2 through 5-7.
5.2 Third Stage Interface Analysis
- Interfaces between the. IU_ second and third stages are in a
transitory state. ECP 247 is in the final approval cycle to remove
the-third stage avionics so this NASA-unique interface will soon
disappear. The solid rocket motor (SRM) interfaces will remain
_=: essentially the same except that the spacecraft will.issue the SRM --
ignition command, after second and third stage separation. The
': IUS will still issue the enabling commands which prepare SRM 3 for
firing. A summary of the interface changes associated with the engi-4."
neerin_ change proposal (ECP) is listed in Table 5-2. These inter-
faces are still being negotiated and may change before implementation.
Analysis of the third stage interface also encompasses the
evaluation of the FOM performance capabilities and the dynamic
effects (with control and without control) of third stage/spacecraft
spinup. Some of the spin dynamics parameters to be analyzed arez
• M, I, RCS thrust uncertainty.
• Spin rate at which active control is terminated.
• • Final spin rate uncertainty.
" • Second stage separation effects.
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IMPACT OF REMOVING THIRD STAGE AVIONICS
%
With Spin Without Spin
Interfaces Sta_e Avionics Stage Avionic_
IUS Twin Stage 8 Spacecraft 2 Spacecraft
to Discreta Discrete
Spin Stage Commands Commands
IUS Twin Stage N/A _6 Spacecraft
to Discrete
Spacec-_aft Commands
Spacecraft S/C Measurement *SRM Arm_
to (for i00 bps (4 circuits)
Spin Stage telemetry) *SRM fire
(4 circui_ts_
Spin Stage Payload *Analogs/
to Separation discrates (har'-_=---
Spacecraft (2 circuits) wired ignition
measurements)
Spin Stage and 256 hps: 256 bps:
Spacecraft spin Stage Spacecraft
Telemetry transmission transmission
*New interfaces
Table 5-2
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• SRM 3 burn.
- ISP, thrust alignment uncertainty.
- M, _ uncertainty..
• Flexibility effects_
• S/C separation effects.
These-factors and other error sources contributing to the FOM per-
formance are covered in more detail in Appendix A.
A related short study was conducted during the contract period
to determine whether the IUS would accept an IUS State Vector Up-
. date command after an SRM i burn. Analysis by JPL and MSFC indicated
that this ground update would significantly improve the FOM perform-
ance for planetary missions. The flight software analysis revealed
that the LUS state vector command was inoperative after IUS deploy-
ment. Subsequently, the command was deleted from the CPDS. Boeing --
considers the IU& state vector update to be an improvement in FOM
performance_ and, therefore, they do not plan to incorporate the
capabilities.
5.3 Spacecraft Interface
The changes noted in the previous section for removal of the
third stage avionics are the only modifications to the spacecraft
interfaces for NASA vehicles (twin and three-stage). NASA MSFC
and Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) will be heavily involved in
the IUS DOD/STS software modlflca_lons due to the requirement for
continuing attitude control during deployment of the TDRS appendages.
Boeing ECP ZS-0222 indicates that a new CPDS addendum will be re- -
lease_ and modifications made to the 6DOF simulation, V&V simulauion
and .checkout station. •Analysis associated with these activities
will occur during late i_75 and early 1980.
I
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6, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section presents the study conclusions from the four
basic contract tasks and recommended actions to ensure successful
development of the IUS software for NASA missions.
6.1 Conclusions
The primary concerns associated with the NASA-unique software
development are listed below:
• NASA-unique software requirements as documented in the
CPDS Addendum are incomplete.
• Preliminary and detailed design specification develop-
ment lot the NASA_unique software will be adversely
affected by delays in requirements baselining.
• Cumulative attitude control and guidance errors may
prevent the IUS from meeting the JPL FOM requirements.
• Manual certification of-20 to 30 miss/on data load
(MDL) tapes as currently required for planetary missions
will be very difficult in a short time period (i.e., a
reissue shortly bef_re launch).
• Development of theTORS Addendum to the CPDS will be
on & very tight schedule with initial requirements
release only eight months prior to launch.
Two major software concerns were alleviated during the
reporting period by the following actions:
i. The DOD/STS CPDS was baselined. --
2..- Boeing and TRW brought the sizing and timing es=imates
within computer capabilities.
The DOD/STS CPDS was baselined in January 1979, and placed
under DOD configuration control. Delays in an acceptable baseline
did, however, cause a slap in the software subsystem CDR schedule
such that a delta software CDR was held May 1 thrcuqh 3, 1979 (2.5
months after the IUS System CDR).
As _R,_'"began t._e_preliminary design of _he IUS scftwere In
the fall of 1978, their estimate for software sizing and timing
exceeded computer capabili=ies. A joint S_SO contractor ", >._S,%
team was formed mc address the problems. The Titan software
sizing estimate has now been reduced from a high of 63,509 wcrJs
to 57,600 and DOD/STS software from 60,800 "words to 5_,200 wcrls.
With currently proposed design changes, Boeing projects a fu=her
reduction u= 53,!45 for _ " ".._an and 50,995 for wCw/S_S. These
latest estimates do nut include _n _l=cation =__......,A=A-,.n._e_--
software. H¢;wever, preliminary :iASA-,inique requirements !ef=ni=i_r.s
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do not indicate any significant affect on software sizing if the
Boeing projections on DOD/STS software are accurate.
The current sizing estimates still remain above Boeing's
reaction limits which were set to reserve a comfortable growth
margin for the test phase. Traditionally, problems during test
cause memory increases. Sizing must continue to be monitored as
the NASA software design-matures to ensure that the Boeing estimate
of 50,995 words for DOD/STS is realized. Software-sizing, however,
is no longer an overriding concern.
Timing estimates for the eight flight software timing slots
(i0 msec, 20 msec, 40 msec, 0.5 sec, i sec, 5 sec, 10 sec, and
200 sec) all exceeded 100 percent of the allocation for worst-
:- case timing paths in October 1978. By March-1979 timing estimates
ha_ been reduced tea-worst case of 84 percent utilization for the
i0 millisecond (msec) slot. All timing slot estimates are below
i reaction limits. Again_ the NASA-unique software specification is
not included in the TRW estimates.
! 6.2 Recommendations
_ To .ensure successful development of the NASA-u_ique software,
; MSFC should remain deeply involved in all phases of the-software
production._ Involvement should, follow the-activities outline_
r
i in Figure 4-i which are reiterated below:
• Requirements analysis.
_ • Design analysis.
i
i_ • So ftware--testing.
. Specific recommendations for these activities are presented in
i the follow/ng paragraphs.
6.2.1 Requirements Analysis
The most urgent concern for NASA-unique IUS flight software
is the development of a comprehensive set of requirements that
will accomplish NASA missions. NASA-unique requirements stem f_om
- five sources:
• Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) requirement_
for planetary missions.
• Unique communications requirements.
• Three-stage configuration requirements.
• TDRS software requirements.
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h•_ Guidance, Navi=atlon, and Control Analysis
, : The _US attitude control system must provide stable attitude
control for all flight phases. For powered flight attitude.control
during first and second SRM burns and corresponding RCS vernier
burns, the DOD IUS provisions have been accepted by NASA.
For the three-stage spinner missions, the IUS must provide
,,he capability to spin the third stage/spacecraft up to 70 rpm
for a .spin-stabilized third stage burn. There are no specific
requirements placed on spacecraft separation_attitude. Since the
three-stage spinner _US vehicle is unique to NASA missions, the
demands placed on the attitude control for spinup a_re NASA-unique.
Recently, the design reference mission and planetary injection
accuracy requirements have been changed (see Section B.3 of Appen-
dix B).
_I At present the FOM (see Reference 21) is the only require-
merit placed on the guidance, navigation, and control accuracies.
Farther analysis of the IUS capability to meet this requirement
is recommended.
Boeing, for the design analyses of the coast attitude control
system, has employed a digital computer simulation (Reference 22)
which inludes the following:
• Simplified rigid body.
• Bluw-down thz-ast level.
This anlmysis tool is being used for de_a__e_ spot checks-el
performance. This sLmulation does nct have the capability to
account for the wide range of parameters (as stated in the er__cr
sources Section B. 4 of Appendix B) , cr_ ,,o fully determine statis-
tical injection errors that the spacecraft ".v..__I' be required to
correct.
To determLne correctly the injection errors due ex=._."-_:^_ ...,
- to the control law. (and navigation implicitly), we recommend.
that a detailed computer sLmulation be developed. This simu-
: !a,,ion must include all of" the at'.itude control error sources
(see Sec=ion B.4, Agpendix B), in describing ".he ;--_y..am!.s'_of "'_...e
• _US/SC and should also incorporate _he c=n--r_i law as ._rz.=csei
_v Boeinc. The slmu!aticn ._ i. • _'_ ._az= ' fc''c',..-.-
., 4 I 4 4.. ,
,u.... Z •
• Evaluate 3ceing's .... _ _.='."for spinup.
- • Quantify ,,he control -_cf=ware's 2cn_.rihu=i=n =c
inj so=ion errors.
?
,e ..... =he i.%herent - - " _'_ .... " "'"• _ _'° = " - -.-..=ia.°ze
u for ".hArd =-ag = S?-'4'_,'--
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Communication Analysis
TT&C operations represent a major portion of the NASA-unique
software requirements. None of the communications have been
fully addressed in the CPDS NASA Addendum; however, current Boe-
ing requirements (CPDS Addendum Revision H) specify that STDN
and TDRSS cannot_be used simultaneously on a single mission.
During the MDL tape load,, either one network or the other is
loaded, but not both. By using this scheme, Boeing avoids chang-
ing th@ DOD/STS. software. Unfortunately, this design will not
provide the coverage specified in-SS-STS-100 (Reference 14) . The
following related STDN/TDRSS requirements must also Se resolved,
• Autonomous on-board, selection of the communications
mode (Orbiter, STDN, or TDRSS).
• Removal of failed antennas, TDRSS stations, or STDN __
stations as candidate communications links.
• Maintaining communications_f telemetry during spinup
to obtain final-attitude prior to third stage ignition
(prior to loss of RIMU reference).
Three-Sta@e Confi@uration Analysis
In addition to GN&C performance analysis, the third stage
hardware interface requirements affect the software. Software
modifications associated with ECP 247 should be tracked_to ensure
that SRM3 ignition sequence events are cnordinated prop@rly, with
the spacecraft.
TDRSS Requirements Analysis
Implementation_of the DOD/STS software changes associated
with the TDRSS appendage deployment will be on a tight schedule -
eight months between TDRSS CPDS Addendum release in April 1980
and the launch in December 1980, During this period, the adequacy
of the design must be verified with all analytical tools (6DOF
sLmulator, V&V sLmulator, checkout stations, etc.).
Ideally, the software design for the TDRSS would not only
provide IUS support for TDRSS, but, also, provide a flexible
control process that will support other mission-unique spacecraf=
operations for DOD two-stage and NASA _win-s_aqe vehicle configu-
rations. Analysis of the requirements and desi@n should attempt
to remove unnecessarily restrictive 3pecificaticns.
6.2.2 Design Analysis
AnalYsis. of the NASA-unicue. software pr.__..ina.y='__" ._s._n:_- i-'=
dependent upon developinq a c=ncise require=ents doc'_T.en_. ?or
_nls reason, the software desicn zresen=ed at =he .,Aon CDR -_'" ==
adversely -== " _
_-.ec.e_ by the parallel requirements =evelozmen= shown
in the_cheduie in _i_ure 6-i. Since the .... _=_ -- "" -_- _
-az-
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must be considered incomplete. A similar situation during DOD/STS
software development has resulted in a delta software CDR slipped
until two months after the sytam CDR. An update of the CPPS after
completing planetary equation certification in April of 1980 could
easily slip the NASA software CDR until June of 1980. MSFC needs
a detailed software development schedule from Boeing that indicates
its planning to meet the PDR, CDR, and delivery milestones.
6.2.3 Software Testing
Verification and Validation (V&V) of the IUS flight software
for NASA missions should be directed by NASA. Design analysis
tasks should be performed by NASA to identify not only. that the
CPDS and the CPPS meet NASA mission requirements, but also that
Boeing tests horoughly verify the basic. DOD/STS software package.
i Independent software testing will be performed against test require-
ments developed by NASA which specif Z the types of software tests
needed and the success criteria for each requirement. Since NASA
; has no IUS software development facility, the tests_ill be per-
forme_on a DOD facility - either the Boeing Compan Z facility or the
Martin Marietta facilit Z. These independent tests of.the NASA-
unique software should, attempt to avoid direct duplication of
Boeing validation tests. This independent test effort will attempt
to supplement, not duplicate, Boeing testing.
MDL tapes neleased for NASA TDRSS or planetary missions must
be certified before flight. This certification could become a
_ problem for final_changes close to a launch date. With 20 to 30
MDL tapes per mission, certification will become a t_ne-consuming
process. Therefore, we recommend developing an MDL tape certifi-
cat/on program at MSFC to automatically _rovide the following
capabilities:
• Limit comparison tests.
_ • Tape sum check.
• • Valida_ion._f day-to-day retarget-ing (from one tape
: to the--next).
m
• File builder to provide data parameters for a 6DOF
simulation test of the mission.
• • Plot routine to display the daily launch variations.
This proq_am will provide a quick assurance that the :_L _a_e
d updates are accurate.
il
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IM&S CEMPUTING MEMORANDA FOR THE IUS CONTRACT
Memo
No. Title Date
IUS-78-013 Monthly Progress Report for June 8, 1978
May1978
IUS_78-014 IUS Software Working Group Meeting, June 7, 1978
June 5, 1978
IU8-78-015 NASA Unique IUS Flight Software June 20, 1978 --
Requirement s
IUS-78-016 Evaluation of _he IUS Computer June 23, 1978
Program Developmen_ Plan Revision A
- dated-FebrualT 28, 1978
IUS-78-017 IUS File Subjeot_ Proposed Changes June 28, 1978
j to SS-STS-100, Volumes. 3 and 3-1 -
" IUS-78-018 Monthly Progress Repor_ for Ju/%e July I0, 19.78
19Y8, Contract No. NRS8-33072
_US-78-019 Evaluation of IUS Support Software July ii, 1978
Requirements
IUS-78-020 IUS Softwar_ Development Schedules July 21, 1978
- ZUS-78-021 -Software Lmpact on Planetary Mission July 31, 1978
Accuracy
-- IU8-78-022 /--Monthly Progress Report for. July August 8, 1978
1978, Contract NAS8-33072
_US-78-023 Evaluation of _e Redundancy .Manage- August 8, 1978
ment Requirements for Inertial Upper
S_age (D290-I0_86-I, Revision B)
ZUS=28-024 Evaluation_ of the _nterpretive August-25, 1978
Computer Simulators (ICS) CPDS_
CPCI No. _CS 0001 ....
_US-78-025 Trip Report - _US Baseline Design Augus_ 29, 197S
Review No. 4 and Guidance Technical
; I _nterohange
iUS-78-026 Monthly Progress Repor_ for August September-S, 1978
| 1978, Contract NAS8-33072
_US-78-027 Evaluation of _he NASA Addenda to Sep_e_,ber 14, 197S
"-- • _hs Prime Item Development Specif •
•-o | cation (P!DS) for DOD Two-Stage
; Vehicle _nertia! Upper Suage,
._ S290-70001.
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Memo
No....u. Title Date
IUS-78-028 September Update of the IUS September 14, 1978 ,
Software Development Schedules
/
!US-78-029 Evaluation of th_ IUS CPDS MASA September 26, 1978
Addendum $290-51002, July 28, 1978
ZUS-78-030 Gamma Guidance Trajectory Depen- September 29, 1978
dance on _nitial Gues_ for SRM
Steering Angles
" _US-78-031 Monthly Program Report for Sap- October i0, 1978
tember 1978r Contract NAS8_330_2
IUS-78-032 Trip Report for _he IUS Software October 17, 1978
l Comp_er Produc_ Specification
(C5) Technical Zn_erchange Meeting,
- October i0-ii, 1978
IUS-78-033 Evaluation of the _US Computer Oc_oben 25, 1978
Progr_un Procuremen_ Specification
S-290-51_03, dated September 15,
1978
_ IUS-78-Q34 Evaluation of the _US Computer No%ember 6, 1978
Reecslr=e Integrated Support Plan
(CRISR), D210-i0151-I, September 28,
1978 (Draft)
_ _US-78-035 Monthly Progress Report for Ocuober November 9_ 1978
1978, Contract No. NAS8-13072
XUS-78-036 November Update of the _US Software November 16, 1978
-- Developmen_ Schedules
• IUS-78-037 IUS Spin Stag_ Equations of Motion Novex_er 20, 1979
IUS-78-038 TrAp Report far _he IU5 Software Deoember-ll, 1978
MOS Poetprocessing PDR and OFS C5
_ Specification Technical Interchange
" _ Meeting - November 29-30, 1978
_US-79-039 "_"
IUS-78-040 Mcn.nly Progress Report for November December _, 1979
!978, Contract No. NAS8-33072
_ __ IUS-79-041 ZUS Technical Project Review (..R) December 13, 1973
Software Splinter Session
A-4
00000001-TSG 12
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No. Titl....._e_ Dat._e
IUS-78-042 Gamma Guidance Trajectory Depen- December 21, 1978
dence on Znitial Guess for S_M
S_eerlng Aagles (Galileo Mission)
IUS-78-043 Explicit Definition of the NASA- December 27, 1978
Unique Requirements
_US-79-001 Monthly Progress Report for Decem- January i0, 1979
bet 1978, Contract No. NAS8-33072
IUS-79-002 Evaluation of the IUS Software January 31, 1979
Computer Program Product Specifi-
cation (C5), December 29, 1978,
Release
!US-79-003 Monthly Progress Report for January February 8, 1979
1979, Contract No. NAS8-33072
I_S-79-004 Trip Report - Software Working February 13, 1979
GrouR Meeting and MOS Data Format-
ting PDR, January 31 and February i,
1979
_US-79-005 Evaluation of Boeing Response to February 28, 1979
NASA V&V Simulation CDR RID'S
_US-79-006 Trip Report - Guidance Subsystem February 26, 1979
CDR, February 21, 1979
IUS-79-007 Monthly Pmognesa Report for February March 9, 1979
1979, Contract No. NAS8-33072
IUS-79-008 Software Problem Reports for-the March 21, 1979
NASA B5 Addendum, S19_0_-51002
IUS-79-009 Update of the IUS Smftware Develop- March 19, 1979
merit Schedules
!US-79-010- Evaluation ok the Boeing Software .March 30, 1979
Development Schedule for NASA
IUS-79-011 Monthly Progress Repor_ for March April 9, 1979
1979, Contract No. NAS8-33072
iUS-79-012 Contrac_ NAS8-_072, Final 2sport :lay 2, 1979
(Draft)
!tS-79-013 Monthly Progress _eport f_r A_ril :!ay I_, 197_
1979, Contract No. };AS8-33572
_US-79-014 Monthly Progress Report for May June ii, 1979
1979, Contract _;o. 33972
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APPENDIX B
GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND
CONTROL (GN&C)
1
i
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.. B.I GN&C Software Implementation for Three-sta_e NASA Missions!
_ l The baseline guidance scheme for IUS is Boeing's Gamma
Guidance. This s¢heme solves the guidance problem for performing
l orbit transfers with a space vehicle having a fixed velocity impulseSol d Rocket Motor (SRM). Gamma Guidance permits onboard targeting,
-" orbital maneuvers, and interplanetary injection. This scheme is
based on matching the required set of velocity impulses with the
I impulses available from the IUS.
Th_ transfer orbit is subdivided, from a guidance standpoint,
-- I into a series of arcs and phases. Arcs defin6 all the potential
l coast and powered-flight sectors. Each flight phase identifies a
portion of the transfer orbit where the guidance philosophy is con-
stant. A phase comprises a pair of coast/powered flight arcs.
Figure B.I-I shows how the vehicle configuration, guidance phase,
_ and guidance, navigauion and control (GN&C) software activities
for a three-stage NASA mission vary with time. The arcs/phases and
_ different guidance modes are. shown in Figure B.I-2. Phase 5 inFigures B.I-I and B.I--2 shows the third stage, which will be spun
i_ up for stabillty by the IUS Reaction Control System (RCS) prior to _
i _ SRM_ ignition. For this phase, Gamma Guidance will provide phase
in_ial_zation, midcourse guidance, and preignition, but will not
provide the closed loop guidance mode. Figure B.I-3 shows the
. events associated with the third stage.
i
- The operational flight software controls.the IUS in achieving
the placement of an attached payload into a desired orbit_ following
! deployment from the orbiter. Software functions provide calculation
and control capability for the followin_ operations: mission
. sequencing, guidance, attitude control, communications, redundancy
_-_" management, checkout, end navigation. Here, attention will be re-
: stricted to the par_ of the software which consists of guidance,
attitude control, and navigation.
=.
The purpose _of the guidancz _unctlon is to command orientation
: of the thrust vector and to command the S_M/RCS ignition times
required-to change the current vehicle state to an injection state
i_.' that satisfies the mission requirements. Th_ guidance is active
during both coast and powered flight.modes. In the coast mode,
_- " gu±dance command changes resul_ from attitude control maneuvers
i_ and environmental perturbations. During powered flight, the: changes arise from off-_cminal propulsion system performance andhardware anomalies.
_" } Attitude control software provides commands to the reaction
control system and thrust vector control (_IC) actuators to achieve
i and maintain various vehicle attitudes during the IUS mission.Control w ll be provided during powered _llght as well a during
_ " mission coast phases. During powered flight, a_titude control
software provides pitch and yaw commands to thrust vector control
I actuators and roll commands tc the RCS to maintain IUS attitude
_- in an orientation defined.by guidance software. During coast
phases, attitude control software provides roll, pit_h, and yaw ._
| commands to the RCS to accomplish required atui_ude reorientatlons,
| thermal, and other attitude maneuvers required to maln_ain defined
" (
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The purpose of the navigation software is to provide current
values of IUS position, velocity, and attitude with respect to
inertial space, given raw Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
accelerations and attitude rates as input. This software employs
two modes of operation, alignment mode and space navigation mode.
Alignment mode is entered and exited on command prior to flight.
Certain functions are sequenced to effect mathematical alignment
of the attitude quaternion. Position and velocity are maintained
by direct computation. When in _he space navigation mode, atti-
tude reference is maintained by solution of a quaternion differen-
tial equation. Position and velocity are maintained by integration
of acceleration and velocity.
The above description of the guidance, attitude control, and
navigation software is generic in nature, i.e_, applicable to both
the DOD and NASA. The NASA three-stage missions introduce several
areas of uniqueness. The guidance software, which uses a gamma
guidance algorithm, has several more control variables for the
three-stage missions. Unlike two-stage missions, the guidance
computations terminate prior to the initiation of the spinup
(point 3 of Figure B.I-3). The guidance software is inactive
beyond that point as shown in Figure B.I-I. The attitude control
software also has NASA-unique requirements. The three-stage
missions call for spinning the entire second stage/third szage/
spacecraft configuration using the IUS RCS (second stage). How-
ever, the attitude control software.activities cease _rior to the
termination of the spinup phase lpoint 4 of Figure B.I-3). There
are no NASA-unique nequirements for the.navigation software. The.
only impact on this software arises from the longer duration of
the planetary missions. This software becomes inactive during
the spinup phase (point 4 of Figure B.I-3).
i B-7
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B.2 Potential Numerical _nstability in the Gamma.Guidance Iteration
In Reference i, concerns regarding the potential numerical
instability in the Gamma Guidance iteration scheme were expressed.
M&S Computing conducted a study to examine the Gamma Guidance
convergence criteria by exercising Boeing's Gamma Guidance Analysis
Program. The preliminary investigation was limited to examining_
the effect of deviations in the initial guesses of the control
steering angles with respect to a Boeing-supplied solution. Two
mission_ were examined: (1) a two-stage Geosynchronous Mission,
(2) a three-stage Galileo Mission. The result s of the study were
reported in References 23 and 24. The study procedure, results and
conclusion for- a _alileo Mission are given below_
A reference trajectory (refer to Table B.2-1) was generate4
by exercising the Boeing Gamma Guidance Analysis Program for a
three-stage Galileo Mission (Reference 23) utilizing MSFC-supplied.
guidance parameters that include values for all control variable
initial guesses. These parameters yielded a trajectory with a
!-- C 3 of 65000 (Km/sec) 2 at final i_sertion from an_earth-parking
orbit of i00 by 35Q nautical miles.
The guidance prediction uses the.steering angles • and
(Table B.l-2) to determine the direction of the impulse vectors
for SRM I, SRM2, and SRM_ burns. The initial guesses of these
angles were varied for _ach different s_mulauion run while all
other MSFC-supplied parameters were unchanged. Resulting trajec-
tories were _ompared with the reference trajectory based upon a
nominal performance vehicle. .........
For purposes of study, a single nonconverging Gamm.a Guidance
Analysis Program simulation is compared with the reference
trajectory. Table B.2-2 describes the _ariation in initial guesses
with respect to the nominal guesses that resulted in a nonconverging
traJ@ctory. Figure B.2,1 is a comparison of the reference trajectory
with the nonconverging trajectory. The number of guidance iterations
per computation cycle shows a maximum number of eight for the per-
turbed case. The lower left-hand table describes the converged
values for the constraint differences at the start of the SRM3
burn and the large values of the nonconverged perturbed case which
resulted in a very io_ final C 3 value. The final C 3 value is given
in _he lower right-hand table.
The nonconvergence of the perturbed case indicates potential
similar nonconvergence in the flight computations. It is pointed
out here that the engineering simulation exercised for this study
does not duplicate the update intervals required by the operational
flight software. Future studies should incorporate realistic compu-
tation frequencies of once every 200 seconds during ccas_ arcs and
once every 5 seconds during powered arcs. This incorporation of
realistic co_putation frequencies may improve the guidance .!
convergence.
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?NOMINALMISSION
- PL-_A_
DEPLOYMENTPOINT (,_0) ANn TERMINAl. POINT (X F} ARE EXPRESS_ED
= : CN TERMS OF ORBITAL ELEMENTS
• I| , C T]
_/; 3E1_I-MAJOR AXIS _.2,294,840. -20,119,240.
=[NO]
_- ECCENTRICITY .03487656 2.081845
I_¢CLINATION 28.4141_ 28.29862
. [o]
ARGIJMENTOF PERIGEE 68.70946 69.75375
E°]
INERTIAL LONG OF ASCENDING NOOE -90.36991 -91.9852S
e[o]
TRUE ANOMOLY -3.764526 104.2503
- -MI3=._ION CONSTRAINTS C3 = 65 KMZ/S2
- 6.g93 x 109 FT2/S2
HOU/L_AEGLE= 95.480
- DEC = -4.00° _
/
I Table B.2-1
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VARIATIONI INITIALGUESSES
• ,_ _
I • ii •
MSFC 67/9 10.1 _5.7 ]I,_ 75,3 4,'7
NOMINAL
II i J ii i
PERTURBED 6_.9 6.1 69.7 _.6 71.3 ' .-7
i • m i •
Z
,RbI-_3.2-2
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In addition, error models should be incorporated in the
guidance scheme to simulate the effects of (i) anomalies resulting
from integrating the guidance gravity model during coast arcs,
(2) IMU errors propagated during coast arcs, (3) off-nominal
engine performance during powered arcs, and (4)LMU errors propa-
gated during powered arcs.
Y
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I B.3 Reference Missions and Performance Requirements
The current Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) System Specification
(SS-STS-100, dated March 17, 1978) covers the following NASADesign Reference Missions:
• Jupiter Orbiter Probe '82 ........
• Mars '84 ......................
l Saturn - Uranus Probe '85
For these NASA planetary missions, the guidance and navigation
accuracies are specified by the following paragraph in the system
specification:
3.2.1.2 IUS Planetary Injection Accuracy. The IUS
planetary and non-synchronous mission injection accuracies
shall be determined utilizing the IUS inherent capabilities
required to meet the s_. chronous equatorial accuracy require-
ments of 3.2.1.2 of SS-STS-100 Volume 3 and the spin rate-
requirements of 3.6.1.5. The computational p/ecedures for
determining the spacecraft delta variance shall be in
accordance with JPL document "Determination of IUS Planetary
Injection Accuracy" dated October 1977.
The design reference mission_ and the planetary injection
accuracy requirements have been changed recently (by ECP 247).
The current design reference missions are:
• Galileo (GLL) '82
• International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM) '83
• Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar (VOIR) '83
The mass and injection energy requirements have also been
changed, to be consistent with these new missions. The Raragraph
(3.2.1.2) specifying the planetary injection accurac/.es__has been
deleted and replaced with the following:
Injection accuracies required for Deep Space Missions
are shown in Table B.3-1. For the purpose of evalu-
ating planetary injection accuracies, the figure of
merit (FOM) is to be calculated as follows: ........................
AV = A AIN J AT
where; AV is the midcourse velccity correction covariance
matrix (3 x 3).
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I AIN J is the IUS injection covariance matrix (6 x 6)
provided by BAC.
! A is the matrix of trajectory sensitivities (3 x 6)
provided by JPL.
A T is the A matrix transposed.
FOM is t--hesquare root of the sum of the diagonal
elements of AV.'
The above specified FOM is a statistical measure of the
velocity requirements (spacecraft/kV) at midcourse to remove IUS
injection errors. Six error components_ of the injection state
are mapped to the single constraining mission parameter, mid-
courseZIV magnitude. No specific requirements are placed on the
individual_omponents of the injection state (i.e.,. local position
and velocity are not_pecifically constrained). Therefore, to i
determine acceptability of any IUS injection state, an FOM com-
putation (a function of all six components of the injection state)
is required.
. The computational scheme for FOM involves a matrix A I. _.
This matrix is the covariance matrix.of the IUS injection _%ate
error. The generation of this matrix requires analyses of all
sources which contribute to the error in the terminal state.
i.
:i
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f - B.4 Identification of Error Sources and Analysis Required
The accuracy requirements for the planetary missions are
expressed in terms of FOM. -A brief description of FOM is given
below..Most planetary missions are targeted utilizing the so-
called aiming plane defined by the R, S. T encounter planet
coordinate system. S is parallel to t_e _ncoming asymptote of
the spacecraft's orbit, T is defined to be parallel to the
ecliptic and orthogonal _o S. R lies in the Southern celestial
hemisphere and completes the or_hogonal right-hande_ system.
A convenient method for describing the spatial miss at target in
this system is to consider where the spacecraft would penetrate
• the R-T plane for a massless planet. The distance from the target
planEt-center to this point is referred to as the impact parameter
B. B in turn is characterized by B.T, and B.R. Frequently, the
i,? _eviEtion of the flight time from t-he nominEl-is desired, and is
readily expressed in this coordinate system by knowledge of the
spatial miss in the S direction and the approach velocityL(i.e.,
8 _=V® 8t_). For high-energy planetary missions with long flight
_ times,, s_mple velocity corrections.applied early in the mission
_ill produce large changes at encounter. This fact merits mapping
injection errors to encounter and then determining the early maneuver
(nominally ten days post launch) required to null the effects of
_ these errors. The FOM is a measure of the cost of maneuver re-
i quired to null injection errors mapped to encounter rather than to
I : maneuver time (midcourse correction time).
I i Whether _US injection accuracy is expressed in terms of FOM
_ i or IUS inherent capabilities, they both reflect the injection statee rors. The. FOM computa ons or quantitative measures of the IUS
iP_erent capabilities requir_ identification and analysis of the
sources which contribute to the error-in the injection state ....
_ Listed below are the probable error sources:
• -----Navigation.
- IMU hardware.
- Computational effects from navigation equations.
• Guidance.
- Software errors representing off-nominal
performance.
• Guidance constants.
• Quantization on cut-off prediction.
: * Targeting errors due to approximation
in guidance equation.
B-I.6
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I • Attitude c0n_r 01.
- Transport delays.
- zones.
oead
- - Dynamic cross-coupling.
• Third-stage spin dynamics,
- Mass uncertainty.
- Inertia uncertainty ..........
- ECS thrust imbalance.
I : - Spin rate at which motive control is terminated.
_ - Final spin rate uncertainty.
- Flexibility effects.
: • Second stage separation.
• SRM 3 burn.
: " _sp tolerance.
--- Thrust misaligP_ent.
- Center of mass uncertainty._
- Rate of change of moments of inertia---
!',_ • Third stage_ separation.
- Figure B.4-1 shows.the-software impact on planetary mission
,o, -guidance,accuracy. NASA-unique software testing is required = _
_ - navigation, and control tasks. A large portion of_ the third stage
!: is-uncontrolled, and soft,_are ceases--to function (as shown in
._igure B,4-1) several, minute_ prl¢_ to '-" _i..3ec._,n. For software
i _ testing, the point showing software injection in Figure 8,4-i
should be well-defined. To this end, an analysis of the third-
stage dynamics becomes essential.
A preliminary analysis of the performance {of _"stsm an_/cr
software) could be accomplished by accoun-.ing for only the errzrs
encountered due to:
• Initial .TUS state dispersion (at deplolnnen:) .
• I._?Jhardware.
3RM 3 ,_-i • Third s_age dynamics and _u ....
' An analysis o: these errors ,_.__ help _eflne the test r._qu_r_ -
i" ments for the sol:ware when superimzcsed on ".he ._cmina! perfzrT, ance.
B- L7
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i B.5 Analysis Tools
The analysis of the third-stage dynamics is of utmost impor-
i tance at this time. This analysis should include the period
, beginning just prior to the s_art of the spin and ending with
spacecraft separation (Figure B.I-3, terminal events). The
mathematical model must have the inherent capability to imple-
ment the actual control shem•s that are proposed as the design
evolves. The simulation of the mathematical model can b• subdivided
into three segments:
• Thrusters firing with active control and thrusters
firing wlthout active control.
• Stage separ____/_ons.
• SRM 3 burn.
An ideal third-stag• dynamics model should represent "general
motion of a spinning body with varying configuratio_ and mass."
This will describe a body under translation and rotation, with
_elative motion leading to varying configuration, undergoing
changes in mass with time.
There are two operational computer programs which can be used
for preliminary analysis u SAMBO and the Boeing Gamma-Guidance
simulation. SAMBO utilizes linear programming (Simplex Algorithm)
to determine qgasi optimum exoatmospheric trajectory for multistage
r_ckets in the earth!s gravit Z field. This. algorithm allows
three degrees-of-freedom (Newton's equations of mouion) for--the
vehicle. S_MBO can provide an initial reference trajectory that
achieves the missions planetary injection-constraints. The
third-stage trajectory can also be ideally generated by S_MBO.
How•vet, it should be noted that these reference trajectories
generated by SAMBO are based upon optimization of certain cost
functions. Thus, the validity of S;_IBO-generated reference
trajectories are dependent on the choice of the cost functions.
The Boeing Gamma Guidance Simulation makes use of a state
space formulation to solve a t_o-point-boundary value problem
for the set of nonlinear ordinary differential equations that
describe the IUS trajectory. The algorithm is an explicit
: guidance scheme that generates thrust steering angles for both
SRM and RCS base_ on the knowledge of the current state and the
desired mission orbit conditions. Gamma Guidance solves for
ccmblna_lons of S_M and RCS control variables (steering _.,q..s_-_=
and ignition tim•s) depending on the stage of the trajectory to
which the IUS has progressed. The simulation requires an initial
guess of the control variables. Different constraint solutions
exist for differen_ control variable initial guesses. The in_t_a_
values of the control variables could be obtained _rom S_O-
generated trajectories for preliminary analysis.
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: Boeing's reference trajectories (nominal trajectories) and
trajectory generator computer program will be essential for analysis
and softw&re testing.
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PLANNING DOCUMENTATION AND SUPPORT SOFTWARE ANALYSIS
l "
AS ancillary tasks to the flight software analysis, M&S
I Computing evaluated IUS software planning documentation and thesup ort software development documentat on. The echnical
planning effort included maintenance of a set of software
i schedules.
C.l Software Technical Plannin@ Analysis
The most current IUS software development plan (Reference 25)
does not adequately reflect the phased approach to IUS software
development where the Titan, DOD/STS, and NASA versions are -
developed sequentially instead of simultaneously. Schedule and
configuration management impacts of phased development were not
specified for any flight or support software package.
Recommendations for the plan (see Reference 26) emphasized --
the importance of _ustomer insightinto software through formal
detailed schedules and a well-defined configuration controZ plan.
These recommendations were never implemented because the Air Force
decided that the development plan was needed, only for preliminary
planning purposes and allowed the document to lapse. As a result,
the software development schedules are mot formally released, and
the top level schedules, are only updated fo_ major reviews. The
last release-of the iUS Program Milestones Document (D290-i0052-11)
is dated January 17, 197K. During a critical phase when the soft-
ware development pragram is switching emphasis from DOD/STS to
Titan, a set of formallz controlled schedules should be made avail-
able for revie_ and infmrmation. _In.order to plan for manpower loads
and schedules, NASA should ha_e a set of detailed schedules depicting
the flight and support software development and facility utilization.
Another deficiency in the development plan was the lack of
explicit configuration control planning. Boeing and TRW subsequently -
_ identified their basic configuration management practices in tech-
• nical presentation_ and in the test documentation: IUS Software
Test Plan (BAC) and verification test plan (TRW). These documents
cover the internal contractor configuration management practioes
- very well, but they do not adequately address the formal control
process required once the goverrm_ent takes control of a baselined
document--or delivered software _ackage.
To provide management information in the MSFC Software
Projects Schedules and Status Report (Reference 27), M&S Computing
prepared a set of schedules tracking items important to NASA soft-
. ware. updates to these schedules were based upon the best available
information from review presentations and Boeing schedules. Schedule
updates were provided quarterly throughout the contract References
28, 29, 30, and 31).
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__ C.2 Support SoftMare Analysis
Evaluation of the support software complements the qUS
flight software analysis by providing insight into all phases
of flight software production. Familiarity with the compiler
and MOS data formatting software facilitates understanding the
_ _ flight software structure and the format for the program load. --
tapes. Xnowledge of the interpretive computer simulator (ICS),
V&V Simulator and checkout station-(COS) helps ensure that these
. _ test tools will adequately verify all facets of the flight soft-
i . ware design. Finally, the post-processing software is the key to
assessing vehicle and flight software performance. Capabilities
must be coordinated with flight software design to provide adequate
_ - . i_formation for mission performance analysis.
C.2.1 MOS Data Formatting- This software will create a mission data load (MDL) tape
which will be merged with the operational flight software__OFS)
for a unified flight software load.tape. The program is a strai_ht-
forward translator that creates a MDL tape from unique requirements
specified for a mission. At the MOS Data Formatting PDR (Reference
• 32), two requirements modifications were ploposed_ first, an output
tape range test was proposed to augment the input parameter range
test-Bo_ing has already specified; and secondly, a more positive
identification scheme was proposed to ensure.compatible MDL tape
and OFS tape merges. A software identification cross-check was
suggested to replace the manual tape label verification. The.
_ major concern for NASA at this PDR was. the announcement that Boeing
_= plan_ to accommodate the day-to-day launch slip retargeuing requlre-
_ ments by delivering 25-30 M_L tapes; one tape for each_day during
the launch window. Multiple software load tape deliveries dictates
_- e_tensive testing and more complex tape handling procedures for
configurationmanagement.
C.2.2 Test Support Software
_n July 1978, Reference 5 noted deficiencies in the V&_
_= Simulator software requirements. NASA requirements for third
i stage spinup and the third stage command interface were not scheduled;
and the simulator breakpoint/restart capability did not contain
_ a feature that would allow the operator to suspend a test, dump
_ flight computer _emory, and resume testing. These deficiencies
were written up e_ RID's at the V&V Simulator CDR. Boeing'S answer
!_' to the RID's was uo incorporate full breakpoint/restart capability
but to defer the NASA requirements until more specific OFS require-
ments are available.- Prior to the NASA PDR, Bo ing should define
the NASA requirements for a V&V Simulator update and a schedule for
its development (see Reference 7).
L .
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An analysis of the JOVIAL (J73)/M362S Cross Compiler in
Reference 5 pointed out several restrictions on compiler design
that were not related to developing efficient software and there-
foue were unproductive. Restrictions included perceruh of compiler
source code in assembly language, memory limitations, and the
number of_nstructions per statement. These constraints remain
in the current compiler specification dated January 31, 1979.
The review of COS software (Reference 32) revealed that
there are no unique NASA requirements lot this system. Under the
_US checkout concept, an_ NASA_uniqu_ checkout procedures will be
a part of the _est scenarios written by test en_i_neers and
incorporated into the COS software_
Several software improvements were proposed for an ICS
design proposed by the IV&V contractor (see Reference 33).
Recommendation_ were included for performance improvement for
interactive testing of the IUS flight software instead of complete
reliance on batch processing. Another concern was that the ICS _
ha_ been originally proposed as the primary software test _ooi.
Subsequently, the IV&V contractor was authorized to procure a real-
time. V&V Simulation facility with flight hardware (or equivalent)
from the Boeing Company.
C, 2.3 MOS Post-processing Software
The MOS Post-processing CPDS defines a good, general-purpose
data processing package for analyzing IUS flight data. Our only
comment_ were thaZ the softxare should he programmed in an _NSII
standard high-order language for transportability to or.her ccmputers
and that the format of an. IUS memory dump should present the contents
referenced to the specific memory address. BAC had deleted the
references to FORTRA_N in the CPDS and is currently planning to
program in-JOVIAL J73/! which is not an _NSII standard language.
Therefore, a RID was submitted on the proposed language. BAC
agreed to the memory-dump format suggestion. A summary of the
MOS PDR discussions is presented in Reference 34.
During the MOS PDR, the BAC presented an ICD for Mission
Operations Segment Post Processing Software Input Mission Data
(ICS-290-80036). This IC_ specifies the format for ZUS data tapes
delivered to BAC for post-processing.
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